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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff a.nd Respondent,

-vs.-

No. 8288

HUGH BAILEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts of appellant are substantially correct except that the following should

~be

added.

Witness Armond A. Luke, highway patrolman, drove
the defendant and his companion to the residence of Mr.
Delong,, who was the justice of the peace, and while he
,vas talking to Mr. Delong's father, the defendant
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'' jumpW. out of the car and started running ove.r towards
Jack Yardley's place." (R.8) Whereupon Mr. Luke
gave chase after the defendant and caught him.
William q~ Bru~in, Mayor of Panguitch, observed
the -defen-dant- for· some minutes :and testified that the
defendant ''definitely was'' in an intoxicated condition.

(R. 26)
Dewey Becks~rom,
City Marshall,. ·testified
that the
M
.
defendant ''"\\robbied'' as he walked. ''He couldn't walk
like a normal pe-rson, s·oher person, no." (R. 32) The
witness, Beckstrom, stated further that he went out of
Panguitch with Mr. Luke to bring the jeep, which defendant had

driv~n,

hack into Panguitch. In describing

wh·ere the jeep was, the record states:
"A. Out the road here. I "rould say maybe
half a mile from the last house on the highway,
right along in there.
'' Q. This side of that Roller l\fill Hill o?
''A. This side of that hill a ways.''
(R. 35-36)
I

Hugh Bailey, appellant, was convicted, by jury, of
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
·counsel stipulated that a hearing of eviden·ce of an information supplement could be heard before the court
without a jury. The district attorney authenticated for
the court the ·docket of the justice ·of the peace, Orian
Salis.bury, deceased, through his successor justice of the
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peace. Counsel for defendant stipulated 'that the docket
in question ''ras the docket of Orian Salisbury, Justice of
the Peace, and that the records contained therein were in
his handwriting.

(R. 66-'67)

The court received the

justice's docket for "whatever it is and what it says."
(R. 66) Whereupon, counsel for defendant stated ''that

disposes of the previous conviction and it is up to the
court to examine that docket. We take the stand that it
is not signed by anyone-" (R. 67). Defendant's counsel
then made a motion to arrest the judgment of the jury
on the theory that there was no proof of venue in the
action. The ease was continued to be heard in Richfield,
where further argument from defendant's counsel \Vas
heard by the court.
Subsequently, J. L. Sevy, .Jr., District Judge of the
Sixth Judicial District Court, handed down a judgment
on the information supplement which stated, inter alia:
* * and the Court having heard the argunH•nts by the State and the defense counsel, and
the Court having denied the Motion to Arrest
.J udg1nent on the verrliet, and the Court having
\eard the eviden(·e -pertaining -to the offense
charged in the Inforrnation Supplement reg~ard
ing the previous conviction of Defendant of rlriving while under the influence of alcohol, and the
Court finding that the allegattons of the Information Supplement are sustained beyond a reasonable doubt, and that Defendant 'vas guilty as
"~k,
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charged in the Information Supplement, and the
Defendant having waived tin1e for pronouncement
of judgment and having stated that he had no
cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced,
"NOW, T'HEREFORE, IT IS THE· JUDGMENT OF THIS- COURT that the Defendant,
HUGH BAILEY, is guilty of havingibeen convicted
of the p.revio-us offense· as alleged in the Information Supple1nen t herein."
(R. 81)
STATEMENT ·OF _P·OINTS
POINT I.
THE STATE PROVED VENUE AND THE VERDICT OF
.THE JURY IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND
THEREBY THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT.

POINT II.
PROOF O:F A PRIOR CONVICTION WAS INTRO·DUCED
AND THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT ON THE INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENT.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATE PROVED VENUE AND THE VERDICT OF
THE JURY IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND
THEREBY THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT.

Appellant argues that venue was not sufficiently
esta:hlished in this case upon the p-roposition stated as
1

follows:
"Place. In the absence of a contrary statute, an
averment of venue must be proved, and
even an unnecessary allegation of place
descriptive of the offense must he proved."
42 C.J.S. 1263, Sec. 245.
However, such is not the law in the State of Utah. Section 77-8-4, U.C.A. 19"53, states:

"* * *

When a public offense is committed
near the boundary of two or more counties the
jurisdiction is in any of such counties."
The application of this statute precludes any such question from arising. Ho\vever, the Supre111e Court of the
State of l 1 tah has very carefully outlined \vhat constitutes
proof in estahlishing venue. In tltP ease of

~-9talf

r.

ill arasco, 81 li tah 325, 17 P. 2d 919, the defendant wa~

accused of the cri1ae of arson and ('onvicted in the district court. On appeal, the appellant sought to overturn
the judgment on the theory that sinee th(• location of the
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burned house was simply described as "located in the
outskirts of Helper, not in the main business part of
town," and that the defendant's place of business was
"th~ 'west end of Helper, Bryner Subdivision," venue
was riot established as required. This Court, by C. ,J.
Straup, Justice, stated, however :

"* * * Flrom such testimony it 1nay reasonably be inferred that' the building and the goods
destroyed by fire were located in H·elper. We
judicially know that Helper is an incorporated city
of the third class. * * * Helper being an incorporated ·city or town, the trial court and jury could
judicially know that it was in Carbon county. * * *
What in such particular the trial court in the cause
could judicially know or "\vas required to know,
we know. It would have been better had the trial
court charged the jury that they could judicially
know that Helper is in Carbon county, but no complaint is made of that. The assignment a.s to venue
is dis:allowed."
As has been shown by appellant's brief, the jury,
before finding the defendant guilty as charged, 'vere instructed by the court that it was atbsolutely essential to
find, beyond a reasonable rloubt, from the evidence in the
case that the crime of driving while intoxicated occurred
in Garfield County, State of Utah, on Highway 89, about
one mile East of Panguitch. Assuredly, under the decisions heretofore rendered by this Court, such an instruction to the jury was excessive.
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State v. Green., 38 Utah 389, 115 P. 181, was a case
involving the crime of adultery. On appeal, the appellant
plead that because the act was not positively proven to
have taken place in the county in which the pros·ecution
charged in the··complaint, venue was not established. This
Court, holding that venue was sufficiently established,
said: inter alia:
"It is further con tended that proof of the
venue is wanting. It is said that, even though the
evidence be deemed sufficient to show that the
defendant had carnal knowledge of the body of
Madge Morey, there is not sufficient evidence to
sliow that such act was committed in the county of
Sanpete. The venue may be inferred from circuinstantial evidence as well a.s proved by direct
evidence. * * * It is not made to appear that such
act could have been co1nmitted at any other place
except at Mt. Pleasant, in Sanpete county, Utah."
Again, defendant's counsel at no time made any claim
nor introduced any evidence which n1ight have lead either
the court or the jury to the conclusion that the crime
was

actually or even conceivahly co1nmitted in any county

other than Garfield

(~ounty.

The moRt recent deciRion hy the Ruprem.e Court of
the Btate of lTtah, covering the subject of venue in criminal cases, is the case of Slate 1'. Mitchell, ------ Utah ------,
________ P. 2d --------· The C·ourt stated:

"* * * Son1e authorities, including this court,
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permit venue to be established inferen·tially by
circumstantial evidence. We believe and hold that,
however it is proved, it must be done by a preponderance of the evidence only and not beyond a
reasonable doubt, since venue is not an element
of the offense, and there seems to be no reason
to require the same quantum and quality of proof
to prove venue as is required to prove such elements."
Appellant in this case was found to be driving toward Panguitch on Highway 89, and at the time the highway p'atrolman, Mr. Luke, stopped the jeep,

whi~h

the

defendant was driving, the defendant was just East of
Panguitch near what is called Roller Mill Hill. The court
and the jury, on the authority of State v. Marasco, supra,
had the right to take judicial notice of the fact that any
reasonable distance to the East of Panguitch, Utah, had
to he within the County of Garfield. The jury was charged with the specific responsibility of deciding that the
evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that such
"\Vas the case and under this specific instruction, the jury
so held. Furthern1ore, jurors Blust be residents of the
county in which the action is tried (78-46-8 (3), U.C.A.
1953), which is strong support on behalf of the knowledge
of the jurors as to vvhether a particularly described area
was or was not in thP county in which they resided.
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POINT II.
PROOF O:F A PRIOR CONVICTION WAS INTRO·DUCED
AND THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT ON THE INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENT.

Appellant argues that no proof of a prior conviction
was introduced and that the evidence is insufficient to
support the judgment of the court on the information
supplement. The record shows that evidence was introduced by the State in the form of the docket of the justice
of the peace, Orian Salisbury, deceased. (R. 66-67) Mr.
Delong, as successor justice of the peace, testified that he
had received the docket referred to from the county attorney upon his appointment as justice of the peace and
that no deletions or insertions had heen made to the record. (R. 65-66) Defendant's counsel stipulated that the
entry citing the conviction of the defendant, on p·age 234
of said docket, was written in the handwriting of the former justice of the peace, Orian Salishury, and was in fact
his docket.
Section 78-5-16, U.C.A. 1953,

stah}~:

"The several particulars in the next preceding
section specified must be entered under the title
of the action to which they relate, and, unless
otherwise in this Code provided, at the time when
they occur. Such entries in a justices' docket, or a
transcript thereof, certified by the justice or his
successor in office, are prima facie evidence of the
facts so stated."
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To certify, according to Black's Ln \V Dictionary,
3rd Edition, at p·age 301, is :
''To testify in writing; to 1nake known or establish as a fact. * * * To vouch for a thing in
writing. * * * To give a certificate, or to make a
declaration about a writing. * * *"
According to the section of the Utah Code, quoted
above, the docket of a justice of the peace is "prin1a facie
evidence of the facts so stated" and without being rebutted would he proper evidence to he considered hy the
court in this case with regard to the information supplement. There is no evidence in the record to rehut the
docket which "ras authenticated by the successor justice
of the p·eace, Harry Delong, through interrogation of
the State. The court specifically states, in rendering
a judgment against the defendant, that the evidence
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had
been. previously convicted as charged.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMI\1:IT ERROR IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

The evidence supports the verdict on thP question
of venue. The court denied defendant a new trial because
the evidence proved the State's case beyond a reasonable
doubt.
App·ellant's argu1nent centers around the point that
the facts did not prove venue, nor the prior ronviction
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of appellant. However, the jury was instructed that before they could find,defendant guilty, they must find that
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor "occurred in Garfield County, lJtah, on Highway

~9,

about

one mile East of Panguitch, Utah, in said county.'' (R. 72)
After said instruction, the jury found the defendant
guilty. Identification. of the area in .which the crime was
committed is made in the record on the following pages·:
Mr. Luke, Highway Patrolman, R. 4,

~'

14.

Dewey Beckstrom, Panguitch City Marshall, R. 35,

36.
Defense Witness, Garn Wilcox, R. 43.
Defendant, Hugh Bailey, R. 51.
It is important to note that defendant and def.ense
witness both identified the same place all other witnesses
did. As a result, the jury was not puzzled as to where
the crime was committed.
Proof that the crime identified 1n the information
supplen1ent was correct is horne out hy the authentication
of the record of the justice of the peace, and, under Section 78-5-16, became prirna facie evidence thereby. This
evidence was never rebutted by defendant. Defendant's
counsel on his n1otion to arrest judg~nent states:

"* * * I can show Your Honor many cases,
larceny cases and all where the venue isn't proved,
and the State hasn't proved that it is in Garfield
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County and I want to argue that motion before
the court disposes of the case and then the judge
can take judicial notice of whatever is on the conviction, * • *. "
(R. 68)
The defendant's counsel did not introduce any evidence
to contradict the entry in the docket of the justice of the
peace, but even gave 'the ''judge'' the right to take· judicial
notice of a record already declared by statute to be prima
facie evidence.
CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court below should be affirmed.
Res·pectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLIS·TER
Attorney General
DONN E. CASSITY
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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